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Abstract—Large-scale password data breaches are becoming
increasingly commonplace, which has enabled researchers to
produce a substantial body of password security research utilising
real-world password datasets, which often contain numbers
of records in the tens or even hundreds of millions. While
much study has been conducted on how password composition
policies—sets of rules that a user must abide by when creating
a password—influence the distribution of user-chosen passwords
on a system, much less research has been done on inferring
the password composition policy that a given set of user-chosen
passwords was created under. In this paper, we state the problem
with the naive approach to this challenge, and suggest a simple
approach that produces more reliable results. We also present
pol-infer, a tool that implements this approach, and demonstrates
its use in inferring password composition policies.
Index Terms—password composition policy, security, inference,
big data
I. INTRODUCTION
When cybercriminals compromise a user credential database
and release its contents into the public arena, a number of
different interested parties might seek to obtain and use the
data it contains, with varying goals in mind. These might
include, for instance, other groups of cybercriminals seeking to
employ the data in credential stuffing attacks [1], and security
researchers seeking to understand user password choice on
the system concerned [2]–[4]. In particular, the latter group
may be concerned with the password composition policy the
passwords in the database were created under, in order to better
understand how these rules around user password creation
affect the distribution of user password choices.
Security researchers may find themselves confounded in this
endeavour, however, because when the breached user creden-
tial database is released to the public, information about the
password composition policy in place at the time of the breach
is often not included. This could be because the party behind
the breach does not think it relevant, wishes to keep their
methods as secret as possible, or never sought this information
out in the first place—after all, the password composition
policy is of comparatively little interest to malicious actors
seeking to directly employ the credentials in the database
to criminal ends. The only other party known to have this
information is the organisation that was the victim of the data
breach in the first place, who by this point may be unable or
unwilling to disclose any information regarding their security
practices. Reasons for this might include, for example:
• The organisation may have ceased to exist entirely, prior
to the time at which the research in question is being
conducted. There are several examples of this happening
in the real world, for example the now-defunct Christian
dating site singles.org [5] which ceased to exist sometime
after 2009 when their entire user credential database was
compromised in plaintext.
• The organisation might be understandably reluctant to
disclose any information regarding their security prac-
tices for fear of being further targeted or incriminating
themselves by confessing to having taken inadequate
measures to safeguard user data. This is especially the
case in Europe, where tightening legislation around data
protection [6] might make the latter point of particular
concern.
If we cannot obtain a description of the password compo-
sition policy from any of the organisations involved in the
breach, this information has been lost in disclosure—that is,
lost somewhere in the process of the transfer of data between
parties. We are therefore forced to turn to the data that we do
have to attempt to infer as much of that lost information as
we can.
TABLE I
THE FOUR REAL-WORLD BREACHED PASSWORD DATASETS STUDIED IN
THIS WORK, ALONGSIDE THEIR CORRESPONDING POLICIES ACCORDING
TO [7], [8], AND NUMBERS OF PASSWORDS WITHIN THEM.
Dataset Policy Size
RockYou [9] length ≥ 5 32,603,048
Yahoo [10] length ≥ 6 453,492
000webhost [11] length ≥ 6 ∧ digits ≥ 1 15,271,208
LinkedIn [12] length ≥ 6 172,428,238
There is no shortage of breached user credential databases
available online. Arguably the most well-known of these, the
RockYou set [9], like many others (e.g. the Yahoo [10] or
000webhost [11] sets) contains passwords that do not comply
with the password composition policy in place when the
breach happened (see Tables I and II). Reasons for this “noise”
vary, but include:
• Multiple password composition policies per dump—the
RockYou set, for example, is an aggregate made up of at
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least two tables: one containing passwords to the main
web application and one containing passwords used to
log in to “partner services” (e.g. MySpace) which may
enforce different policies [9]. Passwords created under
old policies may also be present. RockYou, for instance,
changed their policy after their data breach in 2009
from minimum 5 characters in length [7] to a stronger
policy [8], [13]. In this case, our methodology gives
the password composition policy that the majority of
passwords were created under, though there is scope for
improving upon this in future work (see Section VI).
• Formatting errors—when the raw data is being processed
by the exfiltrating party, errors may be introduced if
their data processing scripts are not robust. For example,
passwords containing spaces may be read as two separate
data points.
• Intentional padding—if cybercriminals initially offer the
data for sale, the price that they are capable of obtaining
is often contingent on the number of records it contains. It
is therefore possible that the dataset may be intentionally
padded with extra records, some of which might contain
non-compliant passwords.
TABLE II
A BREAKDOWN OF THE NUMBER OF COMPLIANT AND NON-COMPLIANT
PASSWORDS PRESENT IN EACH DATASET LISTED IN TABLE I, ACCORDING
TO [7], [8].
Dataset Compliant Non-compliant
RockYou [9] 32524461 78587 (0.24%)
Yahoo [10] 444942 8550 (1.89%)
000webhost [11] 14936872 334336 (2.19%)
LinkedIn [12] 172409689 18549 (0.01%)
With “noisy” data like this, we cannot, for example, simply
check for the shortest password in the database to determine
the minimum password length constraint specified by the pol-
icy. In fact, the authors of one published work [14] mention in
their publication that the presence of “non-password artifacts”
in the RockYou dataset factored in to their choice of research
methods, at least in part due to the difficulty of filtering
these out. This motivates us to search for a simple, easy-to-
implement method to attempt to infer password composition
policy rules from a password dataset, which would make filter-
ing out at least some of these artifacts trivial. The remainder of
this work outlines an alternative approach that we have found
success with.
a) Contribution: We make the following concrete con-
tributions in this work: (i) for the first time, we draw attention
to the problem of “noise” in publicly-available breached
password datasets in the form of passwords that do not
comply with the password composition policy in place when
the breach occurred (ii) we suggest an easy-to-implement
approach to filtering out this noise by converting the problem
to one of outlier detection, without consulting any organisation
involved in the breach (iii) we make pol-infer [15] available1,
1Available for download at: https://sr-lab.github.io/pol-infer/
the tool used to produce the data and visualisations in our
results (Section IV and Section V).
b) Outline: We have introduced and motivated the work
in this Section I. We describe related work in Section II.
In Section III we describe our approach in detail, showing
the results we are able to obtain from the four password
datasets shown in Table II in Section IV. In Section V
we apply our methodology to datasets created to simulate
both intentional padding and processing with error-prone data
processing scripts. We conclude in Section VI, discussing the
limitations of our approach and potential future work.
II. RELATED WORK
We are not aware of any existing published work that
explores the automation of password composition policy in-
ference from large datasets. Previous research has involved
determining the password composition policies used by active
services. A study by Floreˆncio and Herley [13] gathered pass-
word composition policy information by creating an account
on the service, where possible, and performing web searches
otherwise. This study was later replicated by Mayer et al. in
[8]. In [7], Golla and Du¨rmuth make extensive use of password
data dumps where the password composition policy is known.
III. METHODOLOGY
Our approach is applicable to any numerically-typed pass-
word attribute α which is a function of type Password→ N
which extracts some password property (e.g. length). By
default, pol-infer supports the password attributes in Table III,
sufficient to capture the policies used in the study by Shay
et al. [16] with the exception of the dictionary check on
the comprehensive8 policy, which cannot be expressed as an
attribute of this type.
TABLE III
PASSWORD ATTRIBUTES USABLE WITH pol-infer BY DEFAULT. ANY
ATTRIBUTE APPEARING THE TABLE BELOW CAN BE USED BY THE TOOL
TO INFER PASSWORD COMPOSITION POLICIES.
Attribute (α) Description
length The number of characters in the password
(i.e. its length).
words The number of words in the password. We
define “words” in the same way as in [16]—
as “letter sequences separated by a nonletter
sequence”.
lowers The number of lowercase letters in the pass-
word.
uppers The number of uppercase letters in the pass-
word.
digits The number of digits in the password.
symbols The number of non-alphanumeric characters
in the password.
classes The number of character classes in the pass-
word. We recognise four character classes
in the popular LUDS scheme—lowercase,
uppercase, digits and symbols.
For instance, let us suppose we wish to infer the minimum
length constraint specified by the policy that the 000webhost
set [11] was created under (that is, α = length). In this case,
previous research [7] has established that the answer is 6, and
yet the data in Table IV would seem to contradict this—there
are passwords shorter than this present in the data.
TABLE IV
FREQUENCIES f(l) OF PASSWORDS OF DIFFERENT LENGTHS l IN THE
000WEBHOST SET [11], ALONGSIDE THEIR CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES
cum(l) AND THE MULTIPLIER mult(l) REQUIRED TO REACH THE
CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF THE NEXT LENGTH cum(l + 1).
l f(l) cum(l) mult(l)
1 306 306 6.03
2 1540 1846 1.42
3 775 2621 1.47
4 1221 3842 1.66
5 2456 6388 137.23
6 870209 876597 2.38
7 1208092 2084689 —
It is readily apparent how the data in Table IV may be used
to determine the minimum length constraint in the 000webhost
policy. By observing the outlying value of 137.23 in the
mult(l) column, we can see that we now have an outlier
detection problem. In Table IV, for every length l:
mult(l) =
cum(l + 1)
cum(l)
We can infer the minimum password length enforced by
the password composition policy under which this data was
created by looking for the outlying “sudden increase” in f(l),
taking l + 1 where:
mult(l) = max({mult(m)|m ∈ N})
For the 000webhost data, this gives us the correct answer 6.
By examining the number of digits in a password, as opposed
to password length (that is to say α = digits), we are also
able to determine that the 000webhost policy demands that
passwords contain at least one digit (see Section IV).
By setting a lower threshold on mult(α) we are able to
specify a cutoff point c below which we assume there is
no constraint in place on the attribute α in question. For
α ∈ {length, digits, uppers}, we have found success using
a value of 2 as this threshold (i.e. c = 2). For example,
consider that the 000webhost policy does not demand that any
uppercase letters be present in passwords.
TABLE V
FREQUENCIES f(u), CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES cum(u) AND
MULTIPLIERS mult(u) OF PASSWORDS CONTAINING DIFFERENT NUMBERS
OF UPPERCASE LETTERS u IN THE 000WEBHOST SET [11].
u f(u) cum(u) mult(u)
0 12366006 12366006 1.08
1 1049727 13415733 1.02
2 315637 13731370 1.02
3 267042 13998412 1.02
4 260061 14258473 1.02
5 241305 14499778 1.02
6 220202 14719980 1.01
7 187806 14907786 —
As no value in Table V is outlying above the default cutoff
point of 2, we conclude that there was likely no constraint on
minimum number of uppercase letters present in the password
policy when the dataset was created.
IV. RESULTS: REAL DATA
We present a set of results demonstrating the success of
our approach when used to infer minimum password length
specified by the policy under which 4 different data sets were
created.
• RockYou—breached in plaintext from an online gaming
service of the same name circa 2009 [9]. The policy
in place at the time enforced a minimum length of 5
characters, with no other constraints [7]. Contains a total
of 32,603,048 passwords.
• Yahoo—breached from the Yahoo Voice VoIP service
circa 2012 [10]. The policy in place at the time of the
breach enforced a minimum length of 6 characters with
no other requirements [8]. Contains 453,492 passwords.
• 000webhost—breached from the web hosting service of
the same name circa 2015 [11]. The policy in place at
the time of the breach enforced a minimum length of 6
characters, with at least one numeric digit [7]. Contains
15,271,208 passwords.
• LinkedIn—breached from the professional social net-
working site of the same name circa 2012, the true extent
of this breach was uncovered in 2016 as much bigger than
was initially made public [12]. Unsalted password hashes
in SHA-1 format were extracted, of which ≈ 98% have
since been cracked. It is these cracked passwords we use
in this work. The policy in place at the time of the breach
enforced a minimum length of 6 characters with no other
requirements [8]. Contains 172,428,238 passwords.
The results that follow were produced using pol-infer—
a tool we make available [15] for inferring password com-
position policies from large datasets using the approach we
describe in Section III.
A. The RockYou Set (2009)
Previous research has established that the majority of the
RockYou set [9] was created under a policy enforcing mini-
mum length 5 with no other requirements [7].
The outlying point at l = 4 in Figure 1 indicates that the
password composition policy that most of the passwords in
the set were created under enforces a minimum length of 5.
This aligns with existing literature [7].
B. The Yahoo Set (2012)
Previous research has established that the majority of the
Yahoo set [10] was created under a policy enforcing minimum
length 6 with no other requirements [8].
The outlying point at l = 5 in Figure 2 indicates that the
password composition policy that most of the passwords in
the set were created under enforces a minimum length of 6.
This aligns with existing literature [8].
Fig. 1. Passwords of different lengths l in the RockYou set [9], plotted against
mult(l).
Fig. 2. Passwords of different lengths l in the Yahoo set [10], plotted against
mult(l).
1) Inferring the Absence of Constraints: As no points in
Figure 3 are present above the default pol-infer [15] cutoff
point of c = 2, the tool indicates that there was likely
no constraint on minimum number of digits present in the
password policy when the Yahoo dataset was created. This
aligns with existing literature [8].
C. The 000webhost Set (2015)
Previous research has established that the majority of the
000webhost set [11] was created under a policy enforcing min-
imum length 6 with the additional requirement that passwords
must contain at least one digit [7].
The outlying point at l = 5 in Figure 4 indicates that the
password composition policy that most of the passwords in
the set were created under enforces a minimum length of 6.
This aligns with existing literature [7].
The outlying point at d = 0 in Figure 5 indicates that the
password composition policy that most of the passwords in
the set were created under enforces a minimum of 1 digit in
passwords.
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Fig. 3. Passwords containing different numbers of digits d in the Yahoo set
[10], plotted against mult(d).
Fig. 4. Passwords of different lengths l in the 000webhost set [11], plotted
against mult(l).
D. The LinkedIn Set (2016)
Previous research has established that the majority of the
LinkedIn set [12] was created under a policy enforcing mini-
mum length 6 with no other requirements [7].
The outlying point at l = 5 in Figure 6 indicates that the
password composition policy that most of the passwords in
the set were created under enforces a minimum length of 6.
This aligns with existing literature [7].
V. RESULTS: SYNTHETIC DATA
In order to simulate the effect of some of the circumstances
mentioned in Section I that could potentially create non-
compliant “noise” in real-world password datasets, we created
the following synthetic datasets:
• 2word12 linkedin padded—The LinkedIn dataset [12]
filtered according to a 2word12 policy (at least 12 char-
acters long, at least 2 letter sequences separated by a
non-letter sequence) to leave 1,511,786 passwords. This
has then been combined with the singles.org dataset
[5] (16,248 passwords), elitehacker dataset (1000 pass-
words), hak5 dataset [17] (2987 passwords), and faith-
writers dataset [18] (9709 passwords). This is designed
Fig. 5. Passwords containing different numbers of digits d in the 000webhost
set [11], plotted against mult(d).
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Fig. 6. Passwords of different lengths l in the LinkedIn set [12], plotted
against mult(l).
to simulate intentional padding of a dataset created under
one policy with several other smaller datasets in order to
increase its resale value.
• 2class8 linkedin errors—The LinkedIn dataset [12] fil-
tered according to 2class8 policy (at least 8 characters
long, at least 2 character classes present from lower-
case, uppercase, digits and symbols) to leave 65,271,156
passwords. For every password in this dataset containing
either a space or a comma, this password has then been
split into two or more separate strings along these tokens,
leading to the creation of 404,547 additional records.
This simulates the type of formatting error that might
be introduced by processing scripts after the dataset has
been exfiltrated.
A. Intentional Padding
Figure 7 and Table VI show the use of our methodol-
ogy to recover the original password composition policy of
2word12 linkedin padded (2word12). The outlying points at
l = 11 and w = 1 give us a length and word count of 12 and
2 respectively.
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Fig. 7. Passwords of different lengths l in the 2word12 linkedin padded
synthetic dataset, plotted against the multiplier mult(l) required to reach the
cumulative frequency of the next length cum(l + 1).
TABLE VI
FREQUENCIES f(w), CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES cum(w) AND
MULTIPLIERS mult(w) OF PASSWORDS CONTAINING DIFFERENT
NUMBERS OF WORDS w IN THE 2WORD12 LINKEDIN PADDED SYNTHETIC
DATASET.
w f(w) cum(w) mult(w)
0 2500 2500 11.18
1 25460 27960 39.39
2 1073513 1101473 1.17
3 190996 1292469 1.07
4 89916 1382385 —
B. Formatting Errors
Figure 8 and Table VII show the use of our methodol-
ogy to recover the original password composition policy of
2class8 linkedin errors (2class8). The outlying points at l = 7
and c = 1 give us a length and class count of 8 and 2
respectively.
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Fig. 8. Passwords of different lengths l in the 2word12 linkedin errors
synthetic dataset, plotted against mult(l).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have demonstrated a simple, easy-to-
implement methodology for inferring the password compo-
sition policy under which a password data dump was created
TABLE VII
FREQUENCIES f(c), CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES cum(c) AND
MULTIPLIERS mult(c) OF PASSWORDS CONTAINING DIFFERENT NUMBERS
OF WORDS c IN THE 2WORD12 LINKEDIN ERRORS SYNTHETIC DATASET.
c f(c) cum(c) mult(c)
1 591820 591820 84.87
2 49637360 50229180 1.27
3 13401629 63630809 1.03
4 2044894 65675703 —
without the need to interact with any of the parties involved in
its disclosure. Once we have done this, we are able to trivially
filter out non-compliant passwords if we so wish. We make
pol-infer, the tool implementing this methodology that we used
to produce the results in Sections IV and V, freely available
[15]. We show that results obtained by this tool agree with
existing literature on several real-world password datasets, and
that it is effective on datasets generated to mimic those that
might arise as a result of intentional padding or buggy data
processing.
a) Limitations: While our approach is capable of ap-
proximately inferring password composition policies that place
constraints on specific password attributes, it cannot offer a
guarantee that the inferred policy is accurate or complete. As
an example of a password composition policy rule that would
be very difficult to infer, consider a rule that limits password
length to a maximum of 1024 characters. As very few user-
chosen passwords would be in violation of this rule even in
its absence, its impact on user password choice would be very
limited, making its inference very difficult.
b) Future work: Where time and date of account creation
is available in password data dumps, it may be possible to
detect with some accuracy the date and time of any password
composition policy changes, offering new insight into the
organisation’s internal security practices. This may require pol-
infer to become more modular, acting as a framework capable
of hosting different inference algorithms. Work on pol-infer is
planned to make policy inference more automated and compre-
hensive (e.g. inference of dictionary checks), with an option to
generate password composition policy names in the style used
by [16]. We plan to make use of pol-infer and the methodology
we propose in this work to help prepare password data for
use in research into other aspects of password security, such
as formally verified password composition policy enforcement
software [19].
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